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Abstract 
 
Regan’s essay makes an impassioned and reasonable argument that the problem with our use of non-
human animals is not how cruelly or kindly we treat them, but that we use them at all. He examines 
various ethical positions on the treatment of animals and concludes that as living beings, animals have as 
much right to life as humans. His conclusion, however, is untenable as policy on two fronts. First, it is 
drastically counter to existing attitudes. Second, his argument rests on a particular notion of rights. David 
Hume’s “Is-Ought Gap” is relevant because, just as observable fact cannot by itself support normative 
principles, normative principles alone cannot translate into action. Attitudes toward – and obfuscating 
practices by – animal-using industries must change, but gradually or else risk rejection. Regan dismisses 
what he calls “contractarianism” in favour of egalitarian rights for animals, but evidence suggests 
otherwise. Policies and rights are effective only so long as they are acknowledged. Whatever rights 
animals deserve, they only receive the ones humans grant them. Changes in the treatment of animals will 
only come about only when and if enough people want them to – the goal is to somehow make them 
want to. 
 
 
 
We do know that many...of these animals are the subjects of a life in the sense explained 
and so have inherent value if we do....reason compels us to recognize the equal 
inherent value of these animals. (Tom Regan1) 
 
When addressing the issue of rights for non-human animals (henceforth referred to as 
“animals”) it is noteworthy, as David DeGrazia points out, that of all of the ethical 
discourse on the subject, the opinion that current practices are immoral is practically 
unanimous – the focus of discussion is merely to what degree.2 Of the different views 
on that discussion I have studied, the view presented by Tom Regan in his essay “The 
                                               
1 Tom Regan, “The Case for Animal Rights,” The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book, 3rd ed., Eds. 
Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2003), 148. 
 
2 David DeGrazia, “The Moral Status of Animals and Their Use in Research: A Philosophical View.” 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1991), 49. 
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Case for Animal Rights” seems to be the one with the most reasonable argument. His 
main thesis is that the fundamental problem with our use of animals is not how cruelly 
or kindly we treat them, but that we use them at all.3 He feels that the assumption that 
animals can be viewed in terms of their usefulness to humans rather than in their own 
inherent value is the source of all inhumane treatment. Discussing the comfort of caged 
animals or painlessness of killing livestock – while still caging and killing them – 
would be to Regan like rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. Until this attitude 
changes, says Regan, the problem will not improve.4 This thesis is problematic to me 
not because it is wrong (Regan does make a very compelling argument in its favour) 
but because, as I will show, its reliance on a radical change in attitude among a large 
number of people makes it highly impractical. Furthermore, while I am convinced that 
his is a good argument, I am not convinced that it is entirely correct. A policy needs to 
account for what people are willing to abide by, and any policy – however well-
intentioned or reasonable – which does not is as good as no policy at all. 
In the sections that follow, I will present a summation of Regan's argument, explain 
why it is unlikely to receive popular support, and then attempt to find ways to 
implement his ideas as far as they can go and perhaps adjust them to more closely fit 
my own ideas on the subject. 
 
[E]ven with the stuff we preach about the “sanctity of life,” we don’t practice it...look 
at what we kill: mosquitoes and flies ’cause they’re pests...chickens and pigs ’cause 
we’re hungry. (George Carlin5) 
 
I shall try in this first section to cover the primary points in Regan's essay. His article 
addresses several prevailing notions about how to treat animals and provides some 
conjecture about their feasibility. I will review them briefly and highlight a few points 
to discuss further. He starts with the idea that animals are incapable of suffering or that 
their suffering only matters in terms of “damage to property.”6 He rightly counters that 
this is contrary to all available evidence: animals give every indication that they can 
suffer. The next model is “contractarianism” which contends that moral rights are not 
inherent, but merely a set of customs – either explicit or implied – agreed upon and 
recognized by active members of a society.7 Those who do not directly contribute to the 
society, such as children or animals, can be protected by those who do based on 
preference or sentiment. If an individual elicits little sentiment (such as a rat or other 
                                               
3 Regan, 143. 
 
4 Ibid. 
 
5
 George Carlin, Back in Town, (Atlantic, 1996). 
 
6 Regan, 144. 
7 Ibid. 
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“pest”) it receives little consideration. Regan opines that this would not be so 
objectionable but that humans receive disproportionately preferential treatment.8 
 
Next is the cruelty/kindness view which considers the actor in terms of their cruelty or 
kindness to others (including animals).9 Regan objects that kindness can be misguided 
or limited in scope, and that the mere absence of cruelty is insufficient for justice. His 
next example is utilitarianism, which he objects to in the usual way (harming the few to 
benefit the many, unpredictability of consequences) but also by its tendency of reducing 
individuals to mere vessels of pleasure and pain.10 Regan's final example – and the one 
he has been leading up to – is what he calls the “rights view.”11 He contends that any 
individual, human or non-human, is most importantly the possessor of a life and 
therefore has inherent value independent of their usefulness to others. To treat any such 
without respect or to insist that some (such as humans) have more value than others is 
pure prejudice. It is this view, claims Regan, which obliges us to refrain from any 
instrumental use of animals. The two main points I wish to take from this section regard 
contractarianism and the rights view. Of particular interest to me are the issues raised in 
each case about unfair distinction made between human and non-human or perceiving 
others as means rather than individuals. In the next section, I will put forward some 
challenges to these issues. 
 
That’s the problem: we only want to save the cute animals, don’t we?  Why don’t we 
just have animal auditions? (Denis Leary12) 
 
The prominent philosopher David Hume first raised the problem of the so-called “Is-
Ought Gap.” The problem as originally presented was that any discussion of what one 
ought to do based on how the world is is missing at least one normative proposition, 
and that no form of ethical behaviour can be deduced purely from physical 
observation.13 Less well-discussed, however, is the reverse: an ethical belief by itself 
has no direct bearing on behaviour unless it is accompanied by the capability and the 
will to act on it. Without getting into the pros and cons of either (each would merit a 
paper on its own) I refer to the examples of alcohol prohibition in North America in the 
1920s and the current controversy of file-sharing on the internet. In both cases, the 
                                               
8 Regan, 145. 
 
9
 Ibid. 
 
10
 Regan, 146. 
 
11 Regan, 147. 
 
12 Denis Leary, No Cure for Cancer, (A&M, 1993). 
 
13 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. II, (London: Aldine 1960), 177. 
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normative aspects of each are fairly well-known but are ignored by the majority of the 
population. While there are certainly ethical counterarguments to be made in each case, 
the relevant part to this discussion is that as policy both are ineffective. If a policy runs 
counter to existing beliefs or habits, people will find a way around it. Unfortunately for 
Tom Regan's impassioned and well-crafted recommendation, people do have beliefs 
and habits strongly contrary to it. 
 
Scott Plous has done extensive research into human attitudes to animals and determined 
that our ability to use animals is based on four psychological factors: dissociation from 
harm, conflict reduction, ingroup-outgroup bias, and the similarity principal.14 
Dissociation is the inability (or unwillingness) to see harmful behaviour due to distance, 
language use, or presentation.15 Livestock farms tend to be remotely located, processing 
methods tend to contain a lot of jargon, and animal products are rarely sold in a form 
that resembles the original animal. Conflict reduction is used to offset the emotional 
effects when dissociation is challenged.16 The popular perception of animal treatment is 
that they feel less pain than humans, are better off in captivity than in the wild,17 or 
actually benefit from periodic culls of their population. Ingroup-outgroup bias is the 
tendency to see the world as “us versus them” with preference, of course, given to us.18 
The outgroup is then entitled to fewer rights, if any at all. The similarity principal states 
that people feel more favourably inclined toward those who are more like them and less 
to those who are different.19 Plous’ study identified major differences in regard for 
humans, other primates, non-primate mammals, birds, reptiles, fish and insects.20 
 
Of the preceding, dissociation and conflict reduction seem the most accessible through 
education and industry transparency. Ingroup-outgroup bias and the similarity principle 
would likely be more resistant, but theoretically animals could be brought inside our 
consideration. These measures would increase our empathy, but this may not be 
enough. Susan Opotow attempts to discern what factors influence our “scope of 
justice,” defined as “the psychological boundary within which considerations of 
                                               
14
 S. Plous, “Psychological Mechanisms in the Human Use of Animals.” Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 
49, No. 1 (Spring 1993), 13. 
 
15 Plous, 14. 
 
16
 Plous, 25. 
 
17
 They are thought to have comfortable surroundings, regular meals, no predators (except maybe 
humans). 
 
18 Plous, 29. 
 
19
 Plous, 32. 
 
20 Plous, 34. 
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fairness and moral rules and values govern our conduct.”21 She also identified similarity 
to humans and perceived conflict as factors, but also included utility of animals to 
humans.22 One surprise in the results occurred when Opotow controlled for gender: 
females predictably scored higher than males for empathy with animals, but scored 
virtually identically for scope of justice, suggesting a lack of correspondence between 
empathy and scope of justice.23 Unfortunately, focusing our efforts on the already 
daunting task of building empathy for animals may still not result in establishing animal 
rights. 
 
I mentioned earlier how I wished to revisit Regan's notions of contractarianism and the 
rights view. Both of these, I feel, suffer from the is-ought gap.  I will address these in 
order, as the first will inform the second. Regan’s main objection to contractarianism is 
that it unfairly privileges humanity over animals, but as shown above, we naturally tend 
to do this. Further, we tend to do the same within humanity itself, prioritizing by 
family, society, state, race, et cetera24 despite Regan’s assertions to the contrary. We are 
“bond-forming creatures” that, within reason, should make such distinctions.25 The 
difficulty here, of course, is that this type of reasoning can lead to prejudice and unfair 
treatment. Again, though this ought not to be the case, it very often is. Regarding the 
rights view, Regan submits that all life is inherently valuable simply by being life, but 
this view rests on the assumption that all lives are equally valuable and have equal 
rights – an assumption for which he does not provide support. His objection that we see 
animals as resources ignores the fact that we also see most humans as resources as well, 
without necessarily devaluing them. The clerk at the bookstore, for example, may be a 
good person and is of course deserving of respect, but this is not relevant – nor should it 
be – to the fact that at the moment you merely need them to sell you a book. The 
contractarian view that individuals have worth based on preference appears to be more 
in keeping with the evidence. Even Regan cannot step outside this framework by the 
very fact that he, a contributing member of the human moral community, must advocate 
for animals, rather than animals doing so for themselves. Regardless of what rights 
animals should have, they get the ones we humans give them. 
 
                                               
21
 Susan Opotow, “Animals and the Scope of Justice.” Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Spring 
1993), 71. 
 
22 Opotow, 73. 
 
23
 Opotow, 80. 
 
24 
 Mary Midgley, cited in DeGrazia, 53. 
 
25
  Ibid. 
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It doesn’t matter how big the warnings are…you could have cigarettes that come in a 
black pack, with a skull and a cross-bone on the front, called “Tumors,” and smokers 
would be lined up around the block. (Denis Leary26) 
 
If we were to accept Regan’s argument that all creatures are rights-bearers (not too 
difficult to imagine) and adopt his recommendation of total abolition of all hunting, 
animal testing and livestock agriculture,27 the result would simply be a massive increase 
in black-market animal trading and poaching. Such a law would be too radical to be 
accepted, and likely thought by many to be unjust (despite actually being more just). 
Change of this magnitude must come by degrees over time. The abolition of slavery in 
the United States would have been much harder to implement if it also immediately 
included the right for black people to own land and to vote. (These rights would of 
course have been just, but too drastic to accept all at once.) A steady progression of 
changes, starting with better treatment and eventually leading to abolition in the future, 
seems more plausible. As stated above, changes need to be made, and even Regan 
acknowledges that any such changes would be something of an improvement.28 
 
What sorts of changes, then, should we start with? Education seems to me to be an 
important first step. Many people are not even aware of the issues let alone why they 
are a problem. Plous mentions the issue of dissociation, but more importantly that this 
trait is encouraged and reinforced by various animal-using industries.29 Hunters and 
trappers speak of “harvesting crops” (killing animals) scientists use “bio-reactors” (test 
animals) and farmers “produce beef” (slaughter cows). Farms are still portrayed in 
popular culture as idyllic pastoral residences completely unlike the grim reality of high-
capacity industrial farming. Butchers display cuts of meat which look nothing like parts 
of an animal. Transparency in the industry is a must, but care ought to be taken not to 
overstate the case either. As has been seen with famine relief or anti-smoking ads (see 
above quote) too much exposure actually desensitizes people and fosters resentment. 
Industry transparency will also aid policy-makers in determining how animals are 
treated and set appropriate standards. As people become more aware of what is 
happening, the will to act (or at least reduce their meat intake) will increase. If people 
would not knowingly condone this behaviour, then I believe – and I think Regan would 
agree – that they should know. But what if people do find out and still wish to 
continue? (It is possible: I, for one, know about some of the conditions of animal 
consumption but still occasionally eat meat.) At this point, we should probably revisit 
contractarianism and ask ourselves if we value our own needs over that of the animals 
                                               
26 Leary. 
 
27
 Regan, 143. 
 
28
 Ibid. 
 
29 
 Plous, 15. 
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to be used. The answer to that will be up to the conscience of the individual, but I 
believe that the more informed the agent is of the animals involved, the more 
consideration (and thus contractarian “rights”) they will be given. 
 
To be fair, I do acknowledge some difficulties with this approach. I advocate slow 
change when there are some potentially urgent changes that should be made, and this 
slow change would likely give some advantage to those who profit by animal abuse. I 
cannot say without knowing particular cases, but repeat that small tangible change is 
still better than no change despite best intentions. I also acknowledge that wherever a 
metaphorical line is drawn, there will always be those who feel it goes too far and 
others not far enough. Contractarianism, however, relies on majority consensus and 
should find some accommodation which is generally acceptable. Regan’s charge of 
potential bias also hits home, but again we already do this and just need to improve our 
awareness of others to reduce their “otherness” to us. 
 
Viruses, mold, mildew, maggots, fungus, weeds, E. coli bacteria, “the Crabs” – nothin’ 
sacred about those things.  So at best the “sanctity of life” is kind of a selective thing. 
(George Carlin30) 
 
Thus far we have looked at Tom Regan’s view that any creature, by virtue of being 
alive, is inherently valuable and not to be used for the benefit of others. We have heard 
his arguments against various ethical compromises in favour of using animals. He 
seems to have presented a strong case, but might have artificially distinguished 
contractrianism and the rights view. We have then examined some psychological 
factors about why animals can be used by humans without feelings of remorse, and why 
policies designed to prevent this would likely fail. Finally, we have looked at what 
measures might produce more tangible results, namely gradual stages and increased 
awareness at all levels. What can we conclude? Despite Regan’s misgivings, I believe 
that the contractarian approach is the most promising. Indeed, Regan’s own suggestion 
of the rights view seems to be merely a construct of contractarianism: the possession of 
rights has to be recognized and enforceable or else they may as well not be rights. What 
ought to be is not the same as what is; we are human, we favour others in a human way, 
and any rules we establish will be for human behaviour, not animal. Animals will likely 
not be aware of such rules, let alone abide by them. Policies, despite the negative 
connotations of the word, are by their nature anthropocentric. That we value animals is 
laudable, and we should certainly do more, but in the end it will be because we want to. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
30
 Carlin. 
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